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We discuss the sustainability of Chinese high growth relative to growth experience elsewhere, 
and specifically Soviet Russia in the 1950s to the 1960s by asking if the aggregate technology 
can eventually similarly constrain high growth performance in the Chinese case as argued by 
Weitzman in a paper in 1970 discussing the Soviet case. We note in the Chinese case, in 
contrast to Russia, the declining labor share in GDP over time, which suggests a substitution 
elasticity above rather than below one. We use time series data on labor’s share in GDP to 
estimate a substitution elasticity for China, finding that the substitution elasticity is greater 
than one. We then discuss how sub aggregate high growth can occur when there are three 
sectors, and  large outflows of labor occurring from rural to urban areas over time with 
implications for the role of factor substitution in future Chinese growth. We argue that high 
growth in China can be supported in such a framework by a rural to urban labor outflows 
even if the substitution elasticities in both the urban and rural sectors are less than one. We 
estimate these two production functions using share data and these  indicate substitution 
elasticities less than one. As such we suggest that aggregate substitution elasticities do not 
necessarily provide a clear guide as to the sustainability of high Chinese growth. 
JEL-Code: O400. 
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1.  Introduction 
Over the last 10 years there has been much discussion in the literature of the 
future sustainability of China’s high growth rate. In the three years before the 2008 
financial crisis growth rates averaged 11% per year, and over the three decades 
between 1978 and 2008 the average growth rate was nearly 10%. This was despite 
low population growth following China’s adoption of the one child per family policy.   
Commentators have provided a long list of reasons as to why this growth 
performance may not persist into the future.
1 These include China exhausting export 
markets if trade continues to grow at 30% per year; problems of non-performing loans 
in the banking system potentially intensified by bad housing loans following a 
prospective downturn in apartment prices; growing environment problems and 
stagnant to declining agricultural yields; and growing inequality and associated social 
problems. But no discussion to our knowledge of sustainability of high Chinese 
growth has focused on the structure of aggregate technology, and whether or not this 
facilitates or constrains high growth. 
Our point of departure is growth accounting literature following Solow (1957) 
and Dennison (1967), and its application to Soviet growth performance by Weitzman 
(1970). In the Soviet case Weitzman noted progressively slowing Soviet growth from 
the 1950’s through to the late 1960’s in the face of continued high rates of capital 
accumulation and low labor force growth. He suggested that under Solow growth 
                                                               
1  See for example “Beware the middle income trap: China’s roaring growth cannot last indefinitely” (The 
Economist, June 23, 2011), “Waiting for the great fall: Some hedge funds continue to short the China dream” (The 
Economist, Jan 20, 2011), and “Panda bears: Betting against China is in vogue” (The Economist, Oct 8, 2011). All 
these articles highlight the various concerns about China’s growth potential that we list above. 3 
 
accounting, there would over time be a progressive shift in weights away from the fast 
growing capital input and towards the much slower growing labor input if the 
elasticity of substitution in an aggregate CES production function was less than one. 
He then directly estimated the Soviet substitution elasticity (not using first order 
conditions as in econometric literature on market economies) and found the elasticity 
of substitution was around 0.4. This low elasticity of substitution fully explained 
falling Soviet growth rates as more and more capital accumulation served to ever 
further depress the marginal product of the faster growing factor and lower the factor 
share used in one sector growth accounting. 
We evaluate the sustainability of Chinese high growth in light of this Soviet 
discussion by asking if the aggregate technology can eventually similarly constrain 
high growth performance in the Chinese case. We note in the Chinese case the 
declining labor share in GDP over time which suggests a substitution elasticity above 
rather than below one. We use time series data on labor’s share in GDP to estimate the 
substitution elasticity, finding, unlike in the Soviet case, that the substitution elasticity 
is greater than one which for a one sector growth accounting exercise implies 
continual and even accelerating growth for the Chinese case. 
We then discuss the sub aggregate growth accounting case where there is an 
urban and rural sector, and large outflows of labor occur from rural to urban areas 
over time. We show how high growth in China can be supported in such a framework 
by a rural to urban labor outflow even if the substitution elasticities in both the urban 
and rural sectors are less than one. We estimate these two production functions using 4 
 
share data and these indicate substitution elasticities less than one. 
Simple one sector growth accounting applied to China seemingly points to the 
necessity of the aggregate substitution elasticity being above one, and with it factor 
shares (and weights in growth accounting) over time increasing for faster growing 
capital. This view is consistent with declining labor share data. Existing growth 
accounting literature for China (Chow (1987, 1998), Hsieh (2005)) uses 
Cobb-Douglas functions with implicitly fixed weights for factor input growth and 
does not address the issue of the aggregate elasticity. With an elasticity above one 
high GDP growth can be sustained and can even accelerate under continued high rates 
of capital accumulation. On the other hand, if a sub aggregate structure is used in the 
growth accounting exercise then substitution elasticities at urban and rural level can 
both be less than one if sufficient labor mobility between sectors occurs. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 3 presents 
model specification. Section 4 to 5 present data and empirical results. Section 6 to 7 
discuss implications of our results. Section 8 concludes. 5 
 
2.  Literature review 
Growth accounting analysis usually proceeds using Cobb-Douglas production 
functions, assuming the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is one. 
However, the constancy of labor’s share (and accordingly a unit elasticity of 
substitution) has been questioned in a number of studies. Solow (1957) notes that the 
wage share in the US for the period 1929-1954 was not stable. Kravis (1959) reports 
evidence that in the first half of the 20
th century there was a long run increase in labor 
share in US, while Arrow et al. (1961) use cross country data and find the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor for most industries is lower than one. More 
recently, Antras (2004) estimates aggregate production functions for the US and finds 
the elasticity of substitution is significantly lower than one. 
The magnitude of capital-labor substitution has major implications for the 
sustainability of economic growth, especially in situations where capital grows much 
faster than labor. If the elasticity of substitution is greater than one, output per worker 
becomes infinitely large as the capital-labor ratio increases (Arrow et al., 1961, page 
230). But if it is less than one, diminishing returns will make it progressively more 
difficult for output to grow by largely accumulating one factor.   
Weitzman (1970) notes that the former Soviet Union experienced increases in the 
implicit labor share while capital deepening was occurring. He suggested that if the 
aggregate elasticity of factor substitution was less than one, the weights on the more 
rapidly growing factor, capital, would fall and with it aggregate growth. His estimate 
of the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor for the Soviet economy was 6 
 
significantly lower than one, and he reached the conclusion that the Soviet Union’s 
then high rate of economic growth was not sustainable by accumulating only capital. 
This raises the issue of whether the aggregate technology and specially the factor 
substitution elasticity can eventually play a similar role in the Chinese case and act to 
lower achievable growth rates. 
Capital accumulation has played a major role in China’s economic growth since 
the late 1970’s. Chow (1993) constructed capital stock data from 1952 to 1985 for 
China and estimated a production functions for both the aggregate economy and five 
sectors. He found that 75% of the increase in income between 1952 and 1985 could be 
attributed to capital accumulation, and that technological change made almost no 
contribution to China’s growth during the period. In a subsequent study Chow and Li 
(2002) found that China’s TFP increased by 2.6% annually between 1978 and 1998, 
but capital accumulation was still the major contributor to growth. Both studies 
assumed a unit elasticity of substitution and estimation was also of Cobb-Douglas 
production functions.
2 
During this same period China’s labor share in GDP decreased gradually (Bai 
and Qian, 2009; Benjamin, et al., 2008), which is inconsistent with the assumption of 
a unit elasticity of factor substitution, which implies constancy of labor’s share. 
Several studies have tried to explain this including by globalization (Shao and Huang, 
2010), economic structural change, bargaining power (Li et al., 2009), market 
                                                               
2  Other researchers have also investigated the role of human capital (Whalley and Zhao, 2010; Wang and Yao, 
2001; Bosworth and Collins, 2008), resource reallocation (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Brandt and Zhu, 2010; Song 
et al., 2011), and other factors that can constrain China's growth. There is no discussion, however, of the aggregate 
substitution elasticity between capital and labor. 7 
 
structure (Bai and Qian, 2009), and other variables in econometric work. None seems 
to have focused on the capital-labor substitution elasticity.   8 
 
 
3.  China’s Aggregate Production Function and The Factor Substitution 
Elasticity 
Following Arrow et al. (1961), Berndt (1976) and Antras (2004), we assume 
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t A are indices of capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting 
efficiency,σ is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, the central 
parameter in this paper. When 1 σ = , the production function asymptotically 
approaches a Cobb-Douglas production function, as shown by Arrow et al. (1961) 
using l’Hôpital’s Rule. 
If the output price is PYt, the rental price of capital is Rt, and the price of labor 
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Taking logs on both sides gives:
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After some simple manipulation and with an assumption of constant growth rates 
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    (4) 
The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of labor and capital shares. When 
the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor equals one, the labor share will 
be constant and there will be no variation in the dependent variable. If the elasticity of 
substitution does not equal one, (relative) factor shares will change when capital and 
labor have different growth rates and/or when technological change is biased K L λ λ ≠ . 
For this model to be identified, it is important that capital and labor have different 
growth rates. 
In this paper we use variations both in relative factor shares and in the 
capital-labor ratio to identify the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. 
In particular, we estimate the following for the aggregate economy: 
() () ( ) ln / 1 ln tt t t lshare lshare k t α βδ ε −= + + +                        ( 5 )  
where lsharet refers to labor share, t k refers to capital per labor. We use estimates 
ofβ to infer the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, () 11 σ β =+ . 
Whenβ is below zero and larger than -1, the elasticity of substitution would be larger 
than one. To estimate the same parameter by sector, we use the same specification as 
(5). 
Different first order conditions from profit maximization can be used for a CES 
production technology to estimate the elasticity of substitution. However, it matters 
which first order condition is used in the estimation (see Berndt, 1976; Antras, 2004). 
The first order condition (4) we use is equivalent to specification (6') in Antras 10 
 
(2004).
3  We use this first order condition rather than others for the estimation because 
it helps link the factor shares to the elasticity of substitution.
4 For the same reason, 
we do not use Weitzman's (1970) procedure since he estimates the production 
function directly using a non-linear regression program given the absence of 
competitive markets in central planned Soviet Russia. Weitzman (1970), instead of 
using factor shares to infer production parameters, calculates the implicit factor shares 
using the estimated production function parameters. 
                                                               
3  It is also equivalent to specification (6) in Berndt (1976) if biased technological change is not considered. 
4  In the later section, we use another first order condition to estimate the parameter for a robustness check. 11 
 
 
4.  Data Sources 
For the estimation of equation (5) we need relative factor shares and the 
capital-labor ratio over time. With labor share data being available, the data 
requirements are much less demanding than the specifications in Berndt (1976) and 
Antras (2004). The construction of time series for wages, rental price of capital, and 
output price is unnecessary. 
a)  The labor share 
The labor share is calculated as the share of labor remuneration in GDP. As the 
labor remuneration is only available at the provincial level, the aggregate labor 
remuneration is the sum of all provinces. We divide it by GDP to get the aggregate 
labor share. The data for periods 1978-1992, 1993-2004, and 2005-2007 is collected 
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Figure 1 The Labor Share, China, 1978-2007 
Figure 1 shows the labor share between 1978 and 2007. In the late 1970s and 12 
 
early 1980s, the labor share increased slightly. From 1985 on the figure shows a 
decreasing trend. After some volatility in late 1980s and 1990s it fell gradually. By 
2007 the labor share had reached 0.397. Before 2004 the income for self-employed 
was all classified as labor income, from 2004 on that part of the income is calculated 
as capital income. According to Bai and Qian (2009) the sharp decline in the labor 
share from 2003 to 2004 was largely due to this statistical reason.  To get a 
consistent time series of the labor share, we adjust the data by adding 0.046 (the 
difference between 2004 and 2003) to the labor shares for 2004 and after. The labor 
share still decreased by 7 percentage points after 2003. 
b)  Capital Stock and Labor 
The way we construct Chinese capital stock data is similar to Whalley and Zhao 
(2010) who use a perpetual inventory approach. The initial value of the capital stock, 
1,411.2 billion Yuan is taken from Chow and Li (2002, table 1 in page 250). Given 
real investment of t I in year t, the capital stock can be calculated recursively: 
() 1 1 tt t KK I λ − =− +                                            ( 6 )  
whereλis the depreciation rate. To get t I , we use gross fixed capital formation 
from CSY (2009) and deflate it using an investment deflator. The investment deflator 
for 1978 to 1995 is from Hsueh and Li (1995), and for 1978-1995 from CSY (2009). 
Finally we set the depreciation rate to 5% following Perkins (1988), Wang and Yao 
(2003), and Whalley and Zhao (2010).   13 
 
The solid line in Figure 2 shows the time trend of the real capital stock between 
1978 and 2007. Growing at an annual rate of 9% over the last three decades it 
increased dramatically. In the last decade the average growth rate reached nearly 13%. 
Our employment data is from CSY (2009) and Holz (2006). CSY have data for 
1952-2008, but it is not consistent before and after 1990 because of revisions after the 
1990 population census. Holz (2006) provides adjusted data but it only covers 
1952-2005 (appendix 14, page 238-9). We use the employment data from CSY (2009) 
for 1990 to 2007, and then use data from Holz (2006) to calculate the employment 
growth rate between 1978 and 1990. This growth rate is then applied to the CSY 
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Figure 2 Capital Stock and Labor, China, 1978-2007 
The dotted line in Figure 2 reports employment between 1978 and 2007. 
Employment increased gradually, but the growth rate was much lower than that of 
capital. The capital-labor ratio increased accordingly. With the labor share declining 14 
 
and the capital-labor ratio increasing, an elasticity of substitution between capital and 
labor greater than one is more suitable to describe aggregate production. 
 15 
 
5.  Elasticity of Substitution between Capital and Labor 
5.1 Evidence at the Aggregate Level 
Table 1 reports the results of our estimation. We first estimate model (5) without 
controlling for a time trend. As expected the coefficient for the capital-labor ratio is 
-0.163, significantly negative (column 1). Using the formula σ=1/(1+β), we have the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor being equal to 1.2, significantly 
greater than one. Allowing for technological change (column 2) gives an even greater 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, 1.44. The coefficient of time is 
0.01 (significant at the 5% level), suggesting that labor augmenting technological 
change was faster than that of capital. Table 1 also reports results using data for 
1978-2003 and for 1978-1998. The estimates are similar. 
 
Table 1 Estimates of the Aggregate Elasticity of Substitution 
  Dependent variable = Log (Labor Share / Capital Share) 
 1978-2007  1978-2003  1978-1998 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ln(k)  -0.163 -0.304  -0.142 -0.320  -0.091  -0.262 
  (0.014) (0.040)  (0.021) (0.060)  (0.035)  (0.090) 
t   0.010   0.011    0.009 
   (0.003)   (0.003)    (0.004) 
Constant  -0.089 -19.942  -0.069 -21.489  -0.016  -17.376 
  (0.012) (5.418)  (0.019) (6.982)  (0.035)  (8.520) 
Imputed σ  1.195 1.437 1.166 1.471 1.100 1.355 
Test: σ=1 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0015  0.0289  0.0460 
λK -λL   -0.033    -0.034    -0.034 
Adj-R2  0.828 0.881  0.647 0.738  0.223  0.334 
N  30 30  26 26  21  21 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
The relationship between the labor share and the capital-labor ratio is presented 
in Figure 3. The x axis is the log of the capital-labor ratio and the y axis is the log of 16 
 
labor's relative share. We first run regressions to de-trend these two variables, the 
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Figure 3 Relationship between Labor Share and Capital-Labor Ratio 
 
5.2 An Alternative Model Specification 
Previous studies show that different model specifications often produce different 
estimates for the substitution parameter (Arrow et al., 1961; Berndt, 1976; Antras, 
2004). A thorough investigation of the specification issue is not the purpose of this 
paper, however we have tried one other specification, which give similar results. We 
note that equation (4) is equivalent to the following equation (7): 













σ σσ σ λ λ
δ
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    ( 7 )  
However, when estimating the equations, due to measurement error, equation (7) 
and (4) will not give identical results. We obtain the time series data for  ( ) ln tt WR 17 
 
by using ( ) ln tt tt LWK Rminus ( ) ln tt L K . The coefficients for ( ) ln tt WRwill be the 
estimates for the substitution elasticity. The results are reported in Table 2, which still 
give substitution elasticity greater than one. Compared to those in Table 1 however, 
the elasticity was smaller in magnitude. 
 
Table 2 Estimates of the Aggregate Elasticity of Substitution 
   Dependent  Variable:  ln(K/L)   
 1978-2007    1978-2003   1978-1998  
   (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Ln(W/R)  1.186 1.319  1.150 1.244  1.070 1.068 
  (0.020) (0.076)   (0.028) (0.111)   (0.041) (0.131) 
t     -0.008       -0.005       0.000  
    (0.004)     (0.006)     (0.006) 
Constant  0.101  15.663     0.069  9.752     -0.008   -0.205  
  (0.015)  (8.628)   (0.023)  (11.030)   (0.038)  (11.374) 
Adj-R2    0.992 0.993   0.985 0.985   0.971 0.97 
N   30  30  26 26  21 21 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
5.3 An Alternative Measure of Employment: Human Capital 
Ideally we should use the amount of labor in efficiency unit, instead of the 
amount in man-years. One major component that should be taken into consideration is 
human capital due to its important role in the growth accounting literature. Whalley 
and Zhao (2010) find human capital increased at an annual growth rate of 7.6% 
between 1978 and 2008 if it is constructed in the way they suggest.   
To assess the robustness of our results, we substitute human capital data from 
Whalley and Zhao (2010) for our earlier employment data and re-estimate the 
elasticity of substitution. The results are reported in Table 3. The coefficients for the 
log of the capital-labor (human capital) ratio are significantly negative, and their 18 
 
absolute values are larger in comparison to those in Table 1. When the data for 
1978-2007 is used, the imputed elasticity parameter is 1.8 if a time trend is not 
controlled for. With time controls, the elasticity became 1.5. The results in columns 3 
to 6 suggest that the elasticity is smaller in the earlier period. 
 
Table 3 Estimates of the Aggregate Elasticity of Substitution Using Human Capital 
  Dependent variable = Log (Labor Share / Capital Share) 
  1978-2007  1978-2003   1978-1998 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4)    (5)  (6) 
Ln(k)  -0.448 -0.354   -0.390 -0.312   -0.269 -0.254 
  (0.035) (0.048)   (0.050) (0.057)   (0.072) (0.071) 
t   -0.003     -0.003     -0.002 
   (0.001)     (0.001)     (0.001) 
Constant  4.217 9.579   3.679 8.748   2.565 6.615 
  (0.326) (2.062)   (0.469) (2.208)   (0.667) (2.798) 
Imputed σ  1.812   1.548      1.639   1.453      1.368   1.340   
Test: σ=1  0.0000 0.0001   0.0001 0.0010   0.0132 0.0132 
Adj-R2  0.851 0.877   0.703 0.749   0.394 0.430 
N  30 30   26 26   21 21 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Human capital data is from Whalley and Zhao (2010). 
 
The reason for obtaining higher estimates of the elasticity of substitution when 
using human capital instead of employment data can be seen in equation (4). With a 
higher growth rate in human capital, the change in log(K/L) will become smaller (but 
still positive as long as physical capital increases faster than human capital). For a 





must be negative and relatively larger in absolute value, implying a larger elasticity of 
substitution.  
5.4  Evidence by Economic Sector 
    Holz (2006) provides labor shares in different sectors, which are reported in 19 
 
Figure 4. The primary sector had the highest labor share ranging from 80% to 90%, 
while the secondary and tertiary sectors had much lower shares ranging from 40% to 
50%. Figure 4 gives a different picture from Figure 1: between 1978 and 2002, only 
the labor share in primary sector fell gradually. For the secondary sector, the labor 
share increased gradually between 1978 and 1997, and after that it decreased due to 
the ownership restructuring and more adverse conditions facing urban workers. The 
labor share in the tertiary sector was largely flat between 1978 and the early 1990s, 
and it began increasing after the early 1990s. Beginning from 1996 the labor share in 
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Figure 5 Shares of Employment in Different Sectors, China, 1978-2002. 
 
The employment shares in different sectors also changed during the same period. 
The share of the labor force in the primary sector decreased from over 70% in 1978 to 
around 50% in 2002. In contrast the share of the labor force in the tertiary sector 
increased from nearly 12% in 1978 to 28% in 2002. The share of secondary sector 
employment also increased but to a lesser extent especially after 1997. 
Table 4 reports our estimates of the elasticity of substitution for each sector. The 
elasticity of substitution for each sector depends on whether we control for a time 
trend. When time is not controlled for, the elasticities of substitution in the three 
sectors are 1.4, 0.77, and 0.83, respectively. The two increasingly important sectors 
(secondary and tertiary) have significantly lower than unit elasticities. Controlling for 
a time trend changes the results, but the pattern remains. The primary sector has an 
elasticity of substitution greater than one (=1.2), and the other two sectors have an 
elasticity of substitution either close to or below one (1.0 and 0.7 for secondary and 21 
 
tertiary sectors, respectively).   
 
Table 4 Estimates of the Elasticity of Substitution by Sector 
  Dependent variable = Log (Labor Share / Capital Share) 
  primary sector  secondary sector  tertiary sector 
Ln(k)  -0.290 -0.153  0.307  -0.020  0.200 0.434 
 (0.037)  (0.198)  (0.028)  (0.097)  (0.031)  (0.225) 
year   -0.011   0.030    -0.020 
   (0.015)   (0.009)    (0.019) 
Calculatedσ   1.408   1.181   0.765   1.020   0.833   0.697   
Constant  0.813  11.332  -0.172 -97.336 0.041 26.333 
  (0.148) (21.466) (0.025) (12.314) (0.014)  (9.267) 
Adj-R2 0.744  0.735  0.727  0.925  0.815  0.858 
N 25  25  25  25  25  25 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
Different sectors having different factor substitution has implications for factor 
allocation when income increases (Arrow et al. 1961). This can be clearly seen using 








⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ =+ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠                                 
(8) 
As we noted earlier, rising income has been associated with a declining share in 
the primary sector and an increasing share in the tertiary sector. The primary sector 
having an above unit elasticity implies the decline of employment share should have 
been larger than for the output share. On the contrary, the tertiary sector having a less 
than unit elasticity means employment should increase by more than its output share. 
 
     22 
 
6  Implications for Productivity Growth 
6.1 One-sector Results 
Given a constant return to scale (CRS) production function, ( ) ,
KL
tt t t t YF A K A L = , 
the growth in output ( Y g ) can be decomposed into four parts: 
KL YK L K K L L AA gs g s g s gs g =+ + +                                (9) 
where K g and L g are growth rates of capital and labor, K s and L s are factor shares of 
capital and labor. Given Y g , K g , L g , K s , and L s , the growth rate of capital-augmenting 
and the labor-augmenting efficiency terms, K A g and L A g are not identified. Assuming 
KL A AA ggg == , we can calculate the efficiency growth rates A YK KL L g gs gs g = −− . In 
this paper, we first use the actual factor shares to calculate A g . For comparison, we 
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Figure 6 TFP Growth Rates, China, 1978-2007. 
The results are reported in Figure 6 and Table 5. The aggregate productivity 
growth rates were more volatile in the 1980s and early 1990s. In the mid to late 1990s, 23 
 
aggregate productivity grew at an annual rate of around 4%. Entering the 21
st century, 
aggregate productivity grew at a slightly higher rate. Considering the whole period 
1979 to 2007, however, it is hard to say the productivity growth rate is not constant.   
We also calculate the productivity growth rate under an assumption of constant 
factor shares. Factor shares are first assumed at an average level between 1979 and 
2007, with both the capital and labor shares being around 50%. We also experiment 
using factor shares of 40% and 60% for capital and labor, respectively. It turns out 
that using different factor shares has major implications for productivity growth 
especially in the later period of time, when labor's share declined significantly. Taking 
2007 as an example, the productivity growth rate was 5% when actual factor shares 
are used, and it becomes 6.7% and 8.4% when the labor share is set to 50% and 60%.   
The difference in A g under different assumptions is not hard to understand. 
Because labor increased at a relatively lower growth rate, assuming a constant share 
of 50% or 60% gives labor growth a weight greater than its actual level, and more 
output growth must be attributed to productivity growth. In economic terms, when 
constant factor shares and unit elasticity of substitution are assumed, the marginal 
product of capital decreased to a larger extent than when an elasticity of substitution 
greater than one is assumed, and the contribution of rapid physical accumulation will 




Table 5 Calculations of TFP growth, China, 1979-2007. 
Year  Growth rate (%) 
 





 GDP  Capital  Labor    Capital  Labor    Assumed labor share=    Assumed labor share= 
                         Actual 0.5  0.6   Actual 0.5  0.6 
(1) (2) (3) (4)    (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)    (10)  (11)  (12) 
1979  9.26   0.55   2.17     48.60  51.40    7.88  7.91  7.74    9.49   9.56   9.06 
1980  5.56   1.13   3.26     48.90  51.10    3.34  3.36  3.15    4.95   5.01   4.47 
1981  5.09   1.21   3.22     47.30  52.70    2.82  2.87  2.67    4.38   4.52   3.99 
1982  6.80   2.65   3.59     46.40  53.60    3.64  3.68  3.58    5.18   5.33   4.90 
1983  10.35   3.43   2.52     46.50  53.50    7.41  7.38  7.47    8.94   9.03   8.79 
1984  17.59   4.96   3.79     46.30  53.70    13.26  13.22  13.33    14.79   14.87   14.65 
1985  14.97   7.15   3.48     47.10  52.90    9.76  9.65  10.02    11.31   11.30   11.34 
1986  7.51   7.99   2.82     47.20  52.80    2.25  2.11  2.62    3.81   3.76   3.94 
1987  9.37   8.79   2.93     48.00  52.00    3.63  3.51  4.10    5.21   5.16   5.42 
1988  5.27   8.86   2.94     48.30  51.70    -0.53  -0.63  -0.04    1.07   1.02   1.28 
1989  -4.11   6.01   1.83     48.50  51.50    -7.96  -8.03  -7.61    -6.36   -6.38   -6.29 
1990  7.60   5.06   2.55     46.60  53.40    3.88  3.79  4.05    5.42   5.44   5.37 
1991  12.84   5.80   1.15     47.80  52.20    9.47  9.37  9.83    11.05   11.02   11.15 
1992  16.17   7.70   1.01     49.90  50.10    11.82  11.82  12.49    13.47   13.47   13.81 
1993  14.42   9.53   0.99     50.50  49.50    9.11  9.16  10.01    10.78   10.81   11.33 
1994  9.92   10.42  0.97     49.70  50.30    4.25  4.22  5.17    5.89   5.87   6.49 
1995  7.71   10.36  0.90     48.60  51.40    2.22  2.08  3.03    3.82   3.73   4.35 
1996  8.11   10.31  1.30     48.80  51.20    2.41  2.30  3.20    4.02   3.95   4.52 
1997  7.93   9.86   1.26     49.00  51.00    2.46  2.37  3.23    4.08   4.02   4.55 
1998  7.74   10.44  1.17     49.20  50.80    2.01  1.93  2.86    3.63   3.58   4.18 
1999  7.76   9.75   1.07     50.00  50.00    2.35  2.35  3.22    4.00   4.00   4.54 
2000  10.19   9.66   0.97     51.30  48.70    4.77  4.88  5.75    6.46   6.53   7.07 
2001  9.75   10.05  1.30     51.80  48.20    3.92  4.08  4.95    5.63   5.73   6.27 
2002  10.62   10.95  0.98     52.20  47.80    4.43  4.66  5.65    6.16   6.31   6.97 
2003  11.53   12.97  0.94     53.80  46.20    4.12  4.58  5.78    5.89   6.23   7.10 
2004  13.29   14.11  1.03     58.40  41.60    4.62  5.72  7.03    6.55   7.37   8.35 
2005  12.57   15.76  0.83     58.60  41.40    2.99  4.28  5.77    4.93   5.93   7.09 
2006  13.96   16.89  0.76     59.40  40.60    3.62  5.13  6.75    5.58   6.78   8.07 
2007  15.85   17.50  0.77     60.30 39.70  5.00 6.72 8.39  6.99   8.37   9.71 
Note: a, columns 7-9 are calculated under the assumption of Hicksian-neutral technological change. b, columns 
10-12 are calculated assuming labor augmenting efficiency grew faster than capital augmenting efficiency by 
3.3%. 
We can make other assumptions regarding the growth of factor augmenting 
efficiencies. In Table 1, where we assume both capital augmenting and labor 25 
 
augmenting efficiency grow exponentially, the capital-augmenting efficiency term 
grows more slowly than the labor-augmenting efficiency term by 3.3%. Next, we 
assume  0.033 KL AA gg =− . We can then calculate the efficiency growth rates of labor 
as:  0.033* L YK K K L L A gg s s g s g =+ − − . The growth rates L A g are reported in columns 
10 to 12 of Table 5. Obviously, labor augmenting efficiency grew at a higher rate 
under this assumption than those under the assumption of Hicksian neutral 
technological change. Correspondingly, the capital augmenting efficiency term grew 
at a relatively lower rate. It remains true that assuming constant factor shares produces 
a larger productivity growth in the later period when labor's share declined 
significantly. There is no evidence suggesting any trend for the productivity growth 
rates. 
6.2 Three-sector Results 
Using a similar formula to (9), we can also calculate the TFP growth for each 
sector. For simplicity we do not consider the biased technological change in this 
subsection. The results are reported in Table 6. On average the TFP growth rates in 
the three sectors are 4.7%, 2.2%, and 2.1%, respectively. The significantly higher 
productivity growth is a result of the high labor share for this sector. Mechanically 
with a large labor share and low employment growth, the high growth in the primary 
sector comes from productivity growth as long as capital growth is high. 
Given these TFP growth rates for each sector, we can again calculate GDP 
growth in each sector by assuming the same employment growth rate. We assume 
away the inter-sector labor reallocation by assuming that employment in each sector 26 
 
grew at the same rate, i.e. the growth rate of total employment. We use the actual 
factor shares in each sector to calculate the counterfactual sector GDP growth. As 
shown in the last three columns of Table 6, the predicted growth rates for the 
secondary and tertiary sectors are lower than the actual growth rates, meaning that the 
inter-sector labor allocation has played an important role in China’s growth process. 
Taking the tertiary sector for example, if employment grew at the average rate, the 
average growth rate between 1978 and 2002 would have been 9.9%, rather than the 
actual 12%. 
Table 6 TFP Growth and GDP Growth by Sector, China, 1979-2002 
      









Year  Prim. Sec. Ter.  Prim. Sec.  Ter.   Prim.  Sec.  Ter. 
1979 21.2  7.5  -1.2 18.9  2.1  -10.6  22.1 6.8  -3.0
1980  1.9 8.1 5.4 -0.2  3.2 -3.0  3.3 6.6  3.7
1981  11.0 0.5 7.1 8.3 -3.7 -2.7  11.9 0.2  5.0
1982  11.9 3.7 6.0 8.2  0.2 -0.2  11.8 3.4  6.6
1983 9.7  9.4  13.4 7.7  3.4  2.4 11.1 8.8  10.5
1984 13.9  14.2  29.9 15.2  5.1  14.7  18.1 11.4  23.5
1985 1.8  14.4  33.0 0.8  5.6  20.9  4.2 12.3  30.9
1986  2.6 9.6 9.3 1.4 -1.4 -2.0  4.8 7.3  8.0
1987  8.0 8.9  11.3 5.2 -2.5 -1.2  9.5 8.2  9.5
1988  0.9 5.8 8.4 -1.8 -6.0 -3.4  1.9 5.5  7.1
1989 -6.3  -6.2  0.8 -10.6  -14.5  -10.2  -7.4 -4.6  0.7
1990  16.2 3.9 5.9 13.9 -3.6 -4.3  16.1 4.4  5.3
1991 2.1  14.1  20.5 1.1  5.5  10.6  2.7 14.1  19.5
1992 3.2  20.8  19.9 3.9  14.6  12.4  5.0 20.1  17.7
1993 3.5  22.6  11.0 4.9  15.2  2.3  6.6 20.9  7.5
1994  10.8 9.9 9.4 11.8  3.6 -1.5  14.0 9.2  5.1
1995  8.3 9.1 5.4 8.6 -1.0  -10.1  11.6 8.4  1.3
1996  6.6 8.9 7.8 6.5 -2.2 -6.3  9.5 7.8  5.2
1997  0.2 7.9  12.5 -1.6 -3.1  0.5  1.3 7.5  11.7
1998  3.4 4.7  14.2 2.3 -0.6  6.5  3.6 5.2  13.6
1999 1.1  6.7  12.3 -0.4  4.1  6.1  0.6 7.9  11.9
2000 0.8  10.6  13.8 0.9  11.3  9.9  1.0 11.7  12.5
2001 4.9  7.9  13.8 3.9  6.4  9.8  4.9 8.4  13.427 
 
2002 5.6  9.7  13.4 5.0  10.2  8.7  5.6 11.8  11.5




7  Is Chinese High Growth Sustainable? 
In the previous sections we first obtained an aggregate elasticity of substitution 
greater than one, which seems to imply an optimistic future for Chinese economic 
growth: With an above unit elasticity, output per worker can increase infinitely as 
long as capital keeps growing, and China’s economic growth would not experience a 
downturn. However, the sub-aggregate evidence suggests China’s not being immune 
to a downturn. The discrepancy between the aggregate and sub-aggregate elasticities 
also suggests a major role for labor reallocation between sectors in recent growth 
experience. 
Our results are consistent with the growth accounting literature that stresses the 
role of capital accumulation and labor deepening, in particular labor reallocation from 
agriculture. According to Young’s (2003) research, labor deepening was the key to 
the Chinese high growth rate, while other researchers (Chow, 1993, 2002 for example) 
identify capital deepening as the key force. Our results in this paper, however, suggest 
that both could be important factors behind China’s extraordinary growth 
performance: with a capital accumulation rate much higher than the labor growth rate, 
not to face a downturn in growth quickly, there must be some labor reallocation 
among sectors. In similar vein, recent research by Dekle and Vandenbroucke (2009) 
emphasizes the role of labor reallocation from agriculture. They build a two sector 
general equilibrium model to account for China’s growth, but do not discuss the 
elasticity of substitution between factors. 
Following this line of argument, China’s growth potential lies in the amount of 29 
 
“surplus” labor in the agricultural sector. This concern justifies the heated debate 
regarding whether China has entered an era of labor “shortage.” No consensus has 
been reached yet. While some regard recent wage growth in rural areas and the 
difficulties in recruiting facing some firms as the evidence of labor shortage (Zhang et 
al. 2010), others point to institutional factors that impede labor migration across 
regions and among sectors (Meng, 2010).   
While our results indicate the significant roles played by labor reallocation and 
capital accumulation, they do not necessarily rule out other sources of economic 
growth. Agriculture productivity grew substantially in the early reform period. 
McMillan et al. (1989) find that over three quarters of the productivity growth during 
1978-84 was due to the decollectivization reform. Lin (1991) also identified a major 
role played by the adoption of the household responsibility system in place of a 
communal production system. Agricultural growth slowed after 1984. According to 
Dekle and Vandenbroucke (2009), however, TFP growth for the agricultural sector 
was 4.4% in the period 1978-03, significantly higher than for the non-agricultural 
sector. 
Within the non-agricultural sector, factor reallocation from low efficiency SOEs 
or the government sector to the private sector also played an important role. But its 
relative importance for China’s growth accounting is still debated. Brandt and Zhu 
(2010) identify rising TFP in the non-state non-agricultural sector as the key 
contributor to China’s growth. Song et al. (2011) use financial imperfections and the 
reallocation of resources from the SOEs to the private sector to explain both China’s 30 
 
growth performance and some prominent features in the growth process. Both 
researchers emphasize resource misallocation within the non-agriculture sector and 
the growth potential when resources are reallocated to the more efficient sector. Based 




8  Comparisons with Other Countries and Implications for China’s Future 
Economic Growth 
Unlike many other countries China experienced a continuously declining labor 
share, which is at odds with the Kaldor stylized facts of growth. Based on capital 
deepening and the decreased labor share, we generate an estimate of the aggregate 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, which is bigger than one. This 
suggests China is a different case from former Soviet Union in the 1950s and 60s 
when the former Soviet Union maintained high economic growth through capital 
accumulation. The elasticity of substitution being less than one also means that it 
would eventually face a low marginal product of capital. It was thus impossible for 
the former Soviet Union to keep high economic growth simply by capital 
accumulation. 
It seems that China can keep growing by capital accumulation as long as there is 
a declining labor share. However, after breaking down the aggregate economy into 
different sectors and estimating the elasticity of substitution by sector, the elasticity 
turns out to be either less than one or insignificantly different from one. The decline in 
labor's share mainly come from the labor being allocated from the high labor-share 
sector to the low labor-share sector. This result has major implications which are 
different from those of the aggregate results: namely that it is difficult for China to 
maintain its high economic growth simply by accumulating capital. Future growth 
potential must come from either from labor reallocation from agriculture or from 
efficiency increases within different sectors. 32 
 
9  Conclusion 
 
We use the variation in the labor share of China to infer the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor both at an aggregate level and by economic 
sector. A Cobb-Douglas production function (elasticity of substitution being one) 
seems to be a poor approximation for the aggregate economy, but may be appropriate 
for production by individual economic sectors. The declining labor share at the 
aggregate level is mainly the result of labor being reallocated from high labor share 
sector to low labor share sector. Its implications for China’s economic growth are 
discussed. 33 
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